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Conclusion: Looking to the Future 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] A number of important themes emerge from the chapters in Governing Academia. First, 
decentralization gives individual units—be they university campuses within a state system, colleges within 
a university, or departments within a college—an incentive to act in their own best interests, but less of an 
incentive to work toward the common good. As Heller points out, at the level of a state system, 
decentralization of control may lead to wasteful overlap between campuses. As Wilson shows, 
decentralized budgeting in the form of responsibility center management models may cause units not to 
maximize the quality of the education they are providing students. And, as Lohmann demonstrates, 
decentralized hiring by departments may lead to ossification, replication of the status quo, and a failure to 
move quickly into new areas of inquiry that require interdisciplinary approaches. 
A second theme is that there may not be any single optimal design for a governance structure either for a 
system of state academic institutions (Heller), for boards of trustees (Hermalin), or for the organization of 
the university (Lohmann). Rather, what arises reflects the local history of each organization and the very 
different constraints it faces. Put another way, the variety of governance structures and organizational 
forms that we observe in place at a point in time may be present for very good reasons. It is natural for 
institutional arrangements to evolve as conditions change; hence the movement first away from, and then 
back toward, central control of the public university system in some states may reflect adaptation to 
changing circumstances and needs rather than irrational behavior. 
The third and final theme is that the changing environment that higher education faces is likely to 
continue to influence the forms of governance we see in academia and the way academic institutions 
behave. Recent decades have seen the growing use of part-time and non-tenure-track faculty as 
academic institutions try to cope with financial pressures. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kaplan finds 
that faculty authority in governance tends to be concentrated in academic matters and that more and 
more financial matters are the purview of the administration. The growing threat from for-profit providers 
leads Pusser and Turner to worry about whether the traditional nonprofit higher education sector will 
maintain its concern for the public good and continue to act in the public welfare. The rush to 
commercialize faculty research findings is but one example. 
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Conclusion: Looking to the Future 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG 
A number of important themes emerge from the chapters in Governing 
Academia. First, decentralization gives individual units—be they uni-
versity campuses within a state system, colleges within a university, or 
departments within a college—an incentive to act in their own best 
interests, but less of an incentive to work toward the common good. 
As Heller points out, at the level of a state system, decentralization of 
control may lead to wasteful overlap between campuses. As Wilson 
shows, decentralized budgeting in the form of responsibility center 
management models may cause units not to maximize the quality of the 
education they are providing students. And, as Lohmann demonstrates, 
decentralized hiring by departments may lead to ossification, replica-
tion of the status quo, and a failure to move quickly into new areas of 
inquiry that require interdisciplinary approaches. 
Each suggests that designs of academic governance structures need 
to pay serious attention to reducing problems that decentralization may 
cause. Heller notes that states establish governance structures and 
funding mechanisms that will promote state goals, but that institutions 
work within these constraints to maximize their own goals.1 He also 
notes that there does not appear to be any single form of state gover-
nance that unambiguously works best in each situation. Indeed, it 
appears that states tend to oscillate between more and less state control 
and oversight of their systems. Wilson suggests that responsibility man-
agement center budgeting systems require strong academic leadership 
at the center of the university to ensure academic quality in each of the 
university's colleges. In my book Tuition Rising (2000a), I similarly stress 
the importance of either the university having strong central academic 
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leadership or the central administration having sufficient resources 
(from its own endowments or from revenue that it receives from 
"taxing" each of its colleges) to induce cooperative behavior and get col-
leges to buy-in to university-wide priorities. Lohmann suggests that one 
way for colleges and universities to overcome the resistance of depart-
ments to hire new faculty members with interest in emerging interdis-
ciplinary areas is to assign positions jointly to the departments and the 
interdisciplinary programs. 
A second theme is that there may not be any single optimal design 
for a governance structure either for a system of state academic insti-
tutions (Heller), for boards of trustees (Hermalin), or for the organiza-
tion of the university (Lohmann). Rather, what arises reflects the local 
history of each organization and the very different constraints it faces. 
Put another way, the variety of governance structures and organiza-
tional forms that we observe in place at a point in time may be present 
for very good reasons. It is natural for institutional arrangements to 
evolve as conditions change; hence the movement first away from, and 
then back toward, central control of the public university system in 
some states may reflect adaptation to changing circumstances and needs 
rather than irrational behavior. 
A related inference that can be drawn from Hammond's chapter is 
that as the issues facing universities and the importance of different 
areas of inquiry change, it may be important for universities to consider 
reorganizing their hierarchy so as to facilitate the things they consider 
most important. For example, Cornell University recendy established 
a "virtual" college of information sciences, with the dean having control 
over a number of faculty positions, as a way of stimulating the infusion 
of information sciences into the teaching and research programs at all 
of Cornell's colleges; the prior department of information science, 
which was located within the College of Engineering, was unlikely to 
be able to do this. Establishment of this virtual college is very consis-
tent with Lohmann's suggestions about how to create new interdisci-
plinary programs. 
The third and final theme is that the changing environment that 
higher education faces is likely to continue to influence the forms of 
governance we see in academia and the way academic institutions 
behave. Recent decades have seen the growing use of part-time and 
non-tenure-track faculty as academic institutions try to cope with finan-
cial pressures. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kaplan finds that 
faculty authority in governance tends to be concentrated in academic 
matters and that more and more financial matters are the purview of 
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the administration. The growing threat from for-profit providers leads 
Pusser and Turner to worry about whether the traditional nonprofit 
higher education sector will maintain its concern for the public good 
and continue to act in the public welfare. The rush to commercialize 
faculty research findings is but one example. 
Most of the growth of enrollments in higher education is in the public 
sector, where there are fewer impediments to increased faculty union-
ization than there are in the private sector. The growth in graduate 
student unionization that my chapter coauthors and I pointed out sug-
gests that there will be a cadre of new entrants to the academic profes-
sion who are much more sympathetic to the notion of faculty unions 
than the generations of academics that preceded them. It is thus rea-
sonable to predict that in the years ahead we will see increased collec-
tive bargaining coverage of tenure-track faculty in public higher 
education. The financial stresses that have caused academic institutions 
to substitute part-time and non-tenure-track faculty for tenure-track 
faculty will probably continue, and it is likely that these faculty members 
will increasingly become a fertile ground for unionization activities. 
The Yeshiva decision applied only to tenure-track faculty, so this pres-
sure for unionization of adjunct and non-tenure-track faculty will be 
felt in private as well as public higher education. 
Projections undertaken even before the financial crisis and recession 
of 2001 and 2002 suggest that most states will not have the resources 
to meet the increased demand for college enrollments that is occurring 
now and that is projected to occur during the first decade or so of the 
twenty-first century (Ehrenberg 2000c). This imbalance of resources 
and enrollment pressure will likely lead to increased demands for 
accountability in public higher education and to pressures for increased 
centralization and control of state university systems. 
One way states try to achieve increased accountability is by adopting 
performance incentives in their budgetary processes or, more directly, 
by adopting performance budgeting systems in which institutional 
budgets are directly tied to one or more measures of institutional 
achievement. While there is evidence that states are increasingly adopt-
ing such systems, there is little evidence that this adoption has had any 
measurable effects on how public institutions behave.2 
Demands for accountability will also lead to increased demands, at 
least in the public sector, for more constituent representation—in par-
ticular, faculty and students—on boards of trustees. Freedman suggests 
that it would be wise for institutions to resist such pressures, because 
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he fears that "constituent trustees" often perceive themselves as acting 
as representatives of their constituents, rather than as acting in a fidu-
ciary capacity. 
The growing need to raise revenues from sources other than tuition 
or state appropriations will lead to increased pressure on both private 
and public academic institutions to increase their annual appeals and 
their endowment. This will in turn likely also create pressure on private 
institutions to expand the size of their boards of trustees, to enable the 
institutions to "reward" more large donors with seats on their boards 
and to keep the donors involved with the institution so that the likeli-
hood of their making future gifts increases. In both private institutions 
and public institutions, where board size is often established by state 
law, we are also likely to see more constituent units (colleges, depart-
ments, and programs) establishing advisory boards to facilitate the units' 
own search for revenues. The growth of these unit boards will increase 
the difficulties that the central administration of each academic institu-
tion faces in trying to maintain academic and economic control over all 
of the institution's activities. As units increasingly search for contribu-
tions on their own, the potential for the types of financial abuses that 
have often been associated with fund-raising for big-time athletic pro-
grams increases (Zimbalist 1999). 
The growing importance of donors to academic institutions is also 
likely to place more pressure on the institutions to respond to the pref-
erences of donors, in terms of both setting the university's priorities and 
its operation. An extreme example of such pressures recently occurred 
when one major donor to Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) 
in Cleveland announced that until the institution's board of trustees was 
reorganized in a manner that he considered satisfactory, he would with-
hold all of his contributions from CWRU and from all of the other 
Cleveland area organizations to which he was a major donor. Given the 
overlapping board structure of these organizations, with important 
CWRU board members also serving on the boards of the other organ-
izations, the donor believed that withholding his contributions from 
other Cleveland area organizations would lead those organizations to 
put pressure on CWRU to reform its board structure (Pulley 2002).3 
Such a form of secondary boycott, while legal because the donor was, 
after all, withholding his own voluntary contributions, raises serious 
ethical issues. 
The growth of nonlegal legal influences that affect academia—statu-
tory, consortia, and regulatory requirements—which Olivas discusses 
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are also likely to continue. Increasingly accreditation agencies are 
playing a more interventionist role and requiring institutions to develop 
strategic plans. Or to take another example, the NCAA certification 
reviews of Division I varsity athletic programs include gender and 
racial/ethnic equity as criteria, which puts added pressures on universi-
ties to carefully monitor their recruitment of athletes and coaches and 
their expenditures on various sports. 
Equity was evaluated, for example, in the 1999 NCAA certification 
review of Cornell's varsity athletic programs in terms of the salaries paid 
to coaches of men's and women's teams, the gender and racial/ethnic 
representation of coaches, the gender and racial/ethnic makeup of 
varsity athletics, and the distribution of athletic funding between male 
and female teams. Although gender equity requirements are written 
into federal law, there is no such federal law for race/ethnic require-
ments (Ehrenberg 2000a, ch. 17). 
At one point in the Cornell certification review process, in my 
role as chair of the internal review committee, I explained to a repre-
sentative of the Ivy League, who was aiding us in preparing for 
our external certification review, that if the review criticized the 
university for having a smaller share of underrepresented minority 
groups among its varsity athletes than among its undergraduate student 
population, the university had a right to be upset. Cornell was proud 
that the proportion of its varsity athletes from underrepresented groups 
was smaller than the proportion of its undergraduate students from 
underrepresented groups, even if this made it seem like we weren't 
putting enough effort into attracting underrepresented minority ath-
letes. Put simply, Cornell recruits underrepresented minority students 
primarily for academic, not athletic reasons, and the notion that an 
accrediting agency might penalize a university for doing so seemed 
quite silly. 
Fortunately, Cornell was never penalized by the review committee 
for putting more effort into recruiting minority students for academic 
purposes than for intercollegiate sports. This example highlights the 
importance of the governance structure of an institution—the trustees, 
the central and college administrations, and the faculty—being fully 
aware of what the institution's core academic values are and being able 
to explicitly articulate them to external constituents. As the external 
pressures on academic institutions from all of the forces described here 
rise, and the difficulty of governing these institutions increases, the 
ability to do so is likely to become more and more important to the 
institutions' futures. 
